Despite Lewis's immense popularity as an apologist, one must still ask: Are his apologetical arguments sound? Can they stand up to rigorous intellectual scrutiny? That is the central focus of this book.
Lewis defended Christian belief on many fronts, and it would be impossible to consider all his apologetical arguments here. To keep things manageable, we have selected what we consider to be Lewis's five most important apologetical arguments: the argument from desire, the argument from reason, the moral argument, the trilemma argument, and Lewis's response to the problem of evil. The first four arguments are examples of positive apologetics: the attempt to provide positive rational justification for religious belief. The last argument-Lewis's answer to the problem of evilis a piece of negative apologetics: the attempt to defend religious belief by responding to objections.
So what are these five arguments, and are they rationally convincing? Let us begin with the argument from desire.
The Argument from Desire
Lewis's argument from desire (or argument from joy, as some call it) is a modified version of a stock medieval and Renaissance argument for life after death. Versions of the argument are offered by Aquinas (1945 , p. 692), Ficino (1948 , Hooker (1845, p. 201) , the authors of The Spectator (1907, p. 126) , and many others. There are two basic forms of the argument, one philosophical and the other broadly theological. The first appeals to the Aristotelian dictum that "nature does nothing in vain." Aquinas offers a typical statement of this philosophical version of the argument:
[I]t is impossible for natural desire to be unfulfilled, since "nature does nothing in vain." Now, natural desire would be in vain if it could never be fulfilled. Therefore, man's natural desire is capable of fulfillment, but not in this life . . . . So, it must be fulfilled after this life. Therefore, man's ultimate felicity comes after this life (Aquinas, 1956a, p. 166) .
The second version of the traditional argument from desire appeals not to the supposedly naturally knowable notion that all natural desires must be satisfiable, but to the confidently posited goodness and faithfulness of God as revealed in both Scripture and human experience. The Cambridge Platonist John Smith (1618-1652) offers an eloquent version of this form of the argument in his Selected Discourses (1660):
[The soul] knows that God will never forsake his own life which he hath quickened in it; he will never deny those ardent desires of a blissful fruition of himself, which the lively sense of his own Goodness hath
